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C4 RESTRICTED VERBAL INTERACTION IN COURT 
In this unit we look at some examples of constraints on interaction in courtroom dis ­
course, especially examples involving question-and-answer routines between lawyers 
and witnesses and the funnelling of witness narratives towards legally relevant points. 
Identifying presuppositions in legal questions 
Given the structure of an adversarial trial (see Unit A4), the most frequent direct 
speech act lawyers routinely perform is asking questions. Central to advocacy 
training, accordingly, is how to use question forms, both individually and in strategic 
combinations, in order to achieve persuasive effects as well as elicit answers. 
To understand questioning in courtroom evidence, it is necessary first to see the 
difference between different types of questions, especially loaded and leading questions. 
❏	 Loaded questions are questions that contain presuppositions that have not been 
established (e.g. ‘Do you still beat your wife?’ presupposes previous beatings). 
❏	 Leading questions are questions that predispose the addressee towards giving 
a certain answer. Such questions may directly suggest the answer the examiner 
wants, making the addressee feel that words are being put into their mouth (e.g. 
‘You rushed towards him, didn’t you?’). 
The same question may be both loaded and leading. While loaded questions can be 
objected to by either side in an adversarial trial, this is not the case with leading 
questions. In evidence-in-chief, such questions are not permitted except in a small 
number of circumstances: on preliminary matters that precede questions about the facts 
in issue (e.g. the witness’s name and address); on matters not in dispute; when dealing 
with a fact already in evidence; and where leave has been granted to treat the witness 
as hostile. In cross-examination, on the other hand, leading questions are permitted 
as a standard type of question, because of the different purpose of the examination 
(see further discussion on this in Unit B5). 
Even though it is the witness who is seemingly in the spotlight during examination 
and cross-examination, it can be the questions posed to that witness which influence 
jurors’ impression most. This is why questioning, which appears to be a form of 
elicitation entirely dependent on the answers it extracts, can also function as a form 
of persuasion. As described by Matoesian (1993: 151), ‘loaded or leading questions may 
register strong impressions about evidence, regardless of the answer, because they frame 
expectations about both the forthcoming answer and the question’s truth content’. 
Consider each of the following questions: 
1 What has your husband done to you to make you want to kill him? 
2 You immediately left the scene after the collision, correct? 
3 Are you sorry you caused such a terrible tragedy? 
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4 Was he drunk when you stabbed him? 
5 As a matter of fact, you shared the information with him, didn’t you? 
6 You left work at eleven? 
7 Was it a hot day? 
8 Is it not true that you read and deleted that email? 
9 Did you realise that your gun was loaded? 
10 You didn’t actually see anything, did you? 
❏	 Using the brief definitions given above, identify loaded and leading questions 
in this list, and describe why you consider each to be loaded or leading. Keep 
a note of difficulties you encounter in deciding; you can use the difficulties 
you observe in refining the informal tests you develop for distinguishing 
between the two. 
❏	 To what extent is context important in deciding whether a question is 
loaded, leading, or neither? Illustrate by looking more closely at one or two 
of the examples. 
❏	 What sort of presupposition or blame attribution might jurors register in 
their minds simply after listening to each of these questions, even without 
hearing any kind of answer? 
❏	 What kinds of expectation, prejudice or imagined scenario are such 
impressions based on? 
Understanding narrative restrictions in courts 
In Unit B4, we explore how although witnesses are expected to give their testimony 
in their own words, often they do not get to narrate their story freely. There are 
two reasons for this. First, their turns are limited to responding to questions. Second, 
further restrictions are imposed on what they can say in the answers they give. 
Some of those restrictions are outlined in a widely cited legal and anthropological field 
study by William O’Barr and John Conley, which has been revisited in a number of 
influential later publications and commentaries: 
Our analysis of our earlier data repeatedly confirmed the intuition that lay witnesses come 
to formal courts with a repertoire of narrative customs and strategies that are often 
frustrated, directly or indirectly, by the operation of the law of evidence. 
(O’Barr and Conley 1990: 101) 
The O’Barr and Conley list describes a number of legal restrictions imposed on 
witnesses in most American courts. These include: 
1 A witness may not ordinarily repeat what other persons have said about the events 
being reported. 
Activity ✪ 
C4  126	 E X P L O R A T I O N :  A N A L Y S E S  A N D  E X A M P L E S  
2 A witness may not speculate about how the situations or events being reported 
may have appeared to other people or from other perspectives. 
3 A witness may not ordinarily comment on his or her reactions to, or feelings and 
beliefs about, events being reported. 
4 In responding to a question, a witness is ordinarily restricted in digressing from 
the subject of the question to introduce information about something he or she 
believes critical as a preface or qualification. 
5 A witness may not normally incorporate into his or her account any suppositions 
about the state of mind of the persons involved in the events being reported. 
6 Value judgements and opinions by lay witnesses are generally disfavored. 
7 Emphasis through repetition of information is restricted. 
8 Substantive information may not be conveyed through gestures alone. 
9 A witness is generally forbidden to make observations about the questions asked 
or to comment on the process of testifying itself. 
These restrictions, O’Barr and Conley argue, are required by the statutory or 
common law of evidence or by unwritten custom followed in formal courts. But they 
query (O’Barr and Conley 1990: 102) how appropriate such restrictions are, because 
our ordinary ways of speaking suggest that each forbidden practice is common, if not 
essential, in everyday narration: 
It appears that frustration and dissatisfaction are inevitable results of such constraints. 
One federal judge has commented at some length on the fact that litigants frequently feel 
dissatisfied because the trial process does not afford them a fair chance to tell their stories 
(Weinstein 1977). He reports that greater satisfaction for litigants in small claims 
procedures seems to be related to the absence of formal rules of evidence. On the basis 
of his experience, Weinstein believes that 
allowing litigants to introduce evidence relatively freely and to rely on hearsay, 
provided the opponent can call the declarant and otherwise attack him with a 
minimum of barriers, tends to tranquilize him. This truism is demonstrated 
repeatedly in magistrates’ courts where a complaining witness pours out his heart 
to an attentive judge and then, having had his day in court, withdraws the complaint 
(1977: 521). 
 
❏	 Do you agree that the listed prohibitive acts seem common in everyday 
speech? Illustrate each in one or two likely contexts. What functions do they 
serve in such contexts? 
❏	 Now consider each restriction in the specific context of giving evidence. 
What do you think the rationale is behind each restriction? 
❏	 Might it be better if adversarial legal systems allowed more ‘storytelling’ by 
witnesses, then filtered what was said in terms of probative value, rather than 
preventing material being introduced in the first place? 
✪ Activity
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❏	 Is the answer to the previous question purely a matter for the law of 
evidence? Or does it also depend on how important litigant satisfaction is 
for a legal system (i.e. an aspect of the wider legitimacy of proceedings rather 
than specifically of law)? 
Cooperation in cross-examination? 
Implied meanings researched under the heading of implicature in pragmatics help to 
explain how we mean more than we actually say (see Levinson 1983: Chapter 3). For 
example, A asks B: ‘Did you see my email?’ and B responds: ‘I’ve just finished work’. 
Even though A and B appear to be talking about completely different topics, A may 
have no difficulty understanding B’s reply as suggesting she has not had time to read 
her emails yet, having been at work. 
The philosopher Paul Grice, whose work has given rise to a great deal of research 
in pragmatics (Grice 1989), suggested that conversation is guided by an implicit 
principle, the cooperative principle (CP), which operates on the basis of four maxims: 
quality, quantity, manner and relation (the last of these sometimes referred to, and 
later developed into a specific theory, as relevance; Sperber and Wilson 1995). Put 
simply, for efficient communication to take place, Grice argues that speakers will be 
presumed to ‘speak sincerely, relevantly, and clearly, while providing sufficient 
information’ (Levinson 1983: 102; see the rest of that chapter for further explanation 
and examples). Grice did not assume that people follow these maxims all the time, 
though he suggests that much that passes unnoticed in everyday conversation can only 
be explained on the basis that the CP is widely followed. It is when maxims are 
apparently not followed that implied meanings are retrieved, as the hearer infers an 
intended meaning by assuming that the CP is still being adhered to at a deeper level. 
B’s apparently irrelevant response in the example above prompts A to draw the 
inference that B’s work prevented her from checking her email (an inference that may 
depend on other surrounding assumptions such as that B either does not have email 
on her phone or is not able to look at her phone during work, etc.). The overall 
coherence of A and B’s conversation is maintained by suitable inferences. 
The question arises, however, how far a presumption such as that of the CP can 
apply in an adversarial setting such as a courtroom, whose structure and purpose might 
appear to discourage cooperative effort among speakers. This question has been 
addressed at two different levels: in legal theory (jurisprudence), for example by legal 
philosophers such as Andrei Marmor (see Unit D7 for discussion); and through 
observation and analysis of courtroom examination of witnesses and cross-examination 
in trials (Penman 1987). 
Penman reports that all the interactions he observed could be construed as being 
congruent with Grice’s CP. However, the author argues that the data nevertheless do 
not provide support for the assumptions underpinning Grice’s model, since whatever 
cooperation was observed did not occur naturally but was coerced by the court through 
rules of allocated turn-taking. Equally important, Grice’s account of conversational 
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inference does not explore the purposes of verbal interaction other than information 
exchange, or relationships between conversation participants other than those involved 
in a slightly idealised model of conversation. 
An example of courtroom interaction can illustrate this point. The extract below is 
taken from a negligence case in Hong Kong, reported in Ng (2009: 112–13). A former 
ballerina (W) sought damages from her previous employer for a career-ending injury 
resulting from a slippery floor. C is the defence counsel. 
C: 	 Do you agree that people who remain as corps de ballet dancers for up to five years 
or more may remain at that level of corps de ballet dancers for five years or more? 
W: Yes. 
C: 	 And they come to a point where there is no progress to a higher level at coryphée 
and they just leave the company. Do you agree? 
W: Yes. 
C: 	 And do you also agree that people offered solo spots, as you say you were in Pakita, 
might sometimes not be promoted? 
W: Yes. 
C: 	 Now, Ms Charles (ballet instructor) has also said that, although you have a good 
physique, you have little stage personality. Again, is it your evidence that she is being 
dishonest when she expresses that view, or are you prepared to accept that that is a 
view she expresses in good faith? 
W: Yes. 
C: 	 You agreed that view is expressed in good faith. 
W: 	 Yes, on this point. 
C: 	 And do you not agree that this aspect of little stage personality is in other words 
talking about a dancer’s charisma, which is that intangible thing beyond technique? 
W: 	 That would depend on the number of times of performance a dancer has got. A 
dancer would be able to acquire such stage personality through the performances. 
C: 	 That’s not correct. As a matter of common sense, that’s not correct, isn’t it? In reality, 
some people have charisma and some don’t. Some don’t and some acquire it; some 
don’t and some never acquire it. That’s the reality, isn’t it? 
[W tries to say something] 
C: 	 Madam Chan, please wait for the question before you answer. 
C: 	 Do you agree that’s the reality of the situation? 
W: Yes. 
C: 	 I’d like to move to another area if I may. 
❏	 Why do you think many of C’s questions are hypothetical, or about ballet 
dancers in general, rather than about W herself? What is established by the 
technique of starting with general statements in question form? 
❏	 Express as a single proposition the overall argument that C’s chain of 
questions builds up to. 
✪ Activity 
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❏	 Does W show signs of awareness of what C is trying to suggest? If so, 
identify where and how her words show this. Does she have any opportunity 
to defend herself against such implications? 
❏	 Why do you think C interrupts W? 
❏	 Towards the end of the excerpt, why does C intervene to move on to 
another area so quickly? 
❏	 Now consider the excerpt in terms of Grice’s CP. Do this by looking at each 
turn. How far can a Gricean framework account for the interaction between 
C and W? 
Making your own case: the experience of unrepresented 
litigants 
For reasons of legal consistency (but with further consequences), an unrepresented 
litigant is held to the same evidentiary standards as a lawyer in a trial. The verbal 
behaviour of such a litigant, however, will deviate from the lawyer’s professional norm. 
To take a minor example, such a litigant may mistakenly address the judge directly, 
using ‘you’, a style of address common in most social settings but highly unusual in 
a courtroom. Such an error is a breach of etiquette but may not have serious 
consequences. 
But there are other kinds of error that may have serious consequences. At trial, 
objections are properly initiated only for evidential or procedural reasons. However, 
Leung (2015) provides examples, also from Hong Kong, where unrepresented litigants 
have attempted to use ‘objection’ as a means to express disagreement: 
Example 1 
D: Mr. X (plaintiff) never gave me the document – 
P: (stands up; interruption) I object! 
J: Don’t fight for a turn! You sit down. He was talking! 
The problem here concerns the plaintiff P’s transgression of the court’s turn-taking 
system. In another example, the plaintiff also transgresses, but by an almost opposite 
strategy: seeking a turn by politely asking for one. 
Example 2 
P: 	 Your Honour, can I talk now? 
J: 	 Ask all your questions in one go later. Take notes so that you won’t forget! 
Faced with this remonstration, P could only explain that he was old, forgetful and 
illiterate and so could not take notes. 
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❏	 Discuss P’s verbal behaviour in example 1. Where do you think he got the 
idea of saying ‘I object!’ from, as a way of intervening? 
❏	 The principle of orality, or primacy of speech, has traditionally been 
cherished in common-law systems. But to what extent does this example 
suggest a modern adversarial courtroom is suited to the needs of an illiterate 
advocate? 
The following exchange shows how unrepresented litigants often see procedural 
requirements mainly as obstacles to their narration. 
Example 3 
J: 	 You are going to testify in a moment. Will you use the witness statement you 
submitted to the court? 
R: 	What? 
J: 	 The witness statement you handed to court – will you be making use of it? 
R: 	What? 
J: 	 You handed the court a witness statement – will you use it? 
R: 	Statement? 
J: 	 Use the witness statement or not? 
R: 	 He does not want it. (Switches to start narrating his story) 
J: 	 Wait, Mr. X, don’t start yet . . . 
Lay advocates are also responsible for cross-examining witnesses. Cross-examination 
is a highly specialised genre, however, and unrepresented litigants often fail to see the 
point of allowing their opponent to speak. 
Example 4 
J: 	 You can now cross-examine, Mr. X. 
R:	 (respondent): What? 
J: 	 Ask him questions! 
R:	 (to applicant): Eh then, you say you don’t rent it (a property) to me, you say it! 
Our final example is also taken from cross-examination. The plaintiff seemed to have 
difficulty keeping his questions legally relevant. 
Example 5 
P (to D):  Do you sometimes look for part-time jobs? 
J: 	 How is that related to our case? 
P: 	 He said he is poor! 
J: 	 Whether he is poor or not has nothing do with this case. 
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❏	 Describe the unrepresented litigant’s verbal behaviour in examples 3, 4 and 
5. Characterise as precisely as you can the misunderstandings involved. 
❏	 Consider differences between courtroom procedures and everyday com ­
munication. Are such difficulties on the part of litigants to be expected? 
TECHNIQUES IN LEGAL ADVOCACY 
This unit explores a number of questions about the rhetorical strategies employed by lawyers 
in developing their case. We describe discourse strategies used at different stages in court 
proceedings: making an opening statement; presenting an account of the facts in issue by 
taking witnesses through examination-in-chief; cross-examining witnesses whose evidence 
appears to conflict with the account presented; and delivering a closing argument. 
Gaining attention in an opening statement 
In Unit A5, we present a short extract from a famous nineteenth-century opening 
speech by Edmund Burke in impeachment proceedings against Warren Hastings. In 
doing so, we contrast Burke’s high oratory with the simpler style encouraged in modern 
advocacy manuals as the best way to open, by summarising the facts and introducing 
the main issue(s) in dispute. We now juxtapose the opening speeches made by the two 
sides in a single trial, taken from the transcript of a widely reported American case. 
The speeches show how the prosecution and defence opened their respective arguments 
in the 1997 trial of Timothy McVeigh, following the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing 
in 1995 that killed 168 people. 
Prosecution 
HARTZLER: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, April 19th, 1995, was a beautiful day in 
Oklahoma City – at least it started out as a beautiful day. The sun was shining. Flowers were 
blooming. It was springtime in Oklahoma City. Sometime after six o’clock that morning, 
Tevin Garrett’s mother woke him up to get him ready for the day. He was only 16 months 
old. He was a toddler; and as some of you know that have experience with toddlers, he had 
a keen eye for mischief. He would often pull on the cord of her curling iron in the morning, 
pull it off the counter top until it fell down, often till it fell down on him. 
That morning, she picked him up and wrestled with him on her bed before she got 
him dressed. She remembers this morning because that was the last morning of his life. 
That morning, Mrs. Garrett got Tevin and her daughter ready for school and they left 
the house at about 7:15 to go downtown to Oklahoma City. She had to be at work at eight 
o’clock. Tevin’s sister went to kindergarten, and they dropped the little girl off at 
kindergarten first; and Helena Garrett and Tevin proceeded to downtown Oklahoma City. 
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